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 Chapter 4 
Ignorant Bodies and the Dangers of Knowledge in Amazonia 
 
Casey High  
 
In this chapter I consider how anthropology, a discipline that has increasingly adopted 
Foucauldian approaches to the question of knowledge and its production, might also account 
for ethnographic contexts in which ignorance takes centre stage. Based on fieldwork with 
Waorani communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, I explore the mutual implication of 
knowledge and ignorance in Amazonian understandings of learning and being in the context 
of shamanism. Drawing on recent calls for ethnographically grounded studies of ignorance 
(Dilley 2010; High, Kelly and Mair 2012), I raise questions about the tendency to project our 
own anthropological preoccupations with knowledge onto ethnographic contexts in which the 
people we study insist on ignorance as a social value. I also examine how local concerns 
about ignorance, formal education and relations between older and younger generations 
require attention to the ways in which Waorani people understand knowledge to be 
inseparable from bodily experiences. 
Conceiving an anthropology of ignorance requires not only a new approach to 
ethnography, but also some critical reflection on the history of how ignorance has been 
understood and debated by anthropologists. The interpretive practice of anthropology implies 
what Viveiros de Castro (2003: 3) describes as an ‘epistemological advantage over the native’ 
insofar as we claim to know about ‘cultural’ practices that our informants assume to be 
‘natural’. In this process we attribute meanings and functions to the illusions or ‘beliefs’ they 
hold about themselves such that the very premise of anthropological knowledge implies the 
delegitimation of the claims of ‘natives’ (Viveiros de Castro 2003: 4). At the same time, many 
anthropologists today embrace ‘indigenous knowledge’ as a valued object of ethnography. In 
describing this ‘traditional’ knowledge in terms of cultural continuity and the agency of 
 informants, they attempt to remedy precisely the traditional epistemological advantage 
alluded to by Viveiros de Castro. This state of affairs reveals a certain tension between how 
anthropologists conceive of their own knowledge and how they relate to the knowledge of 
others.  
I compare this apparent tension in anthropology to anxieties about the relationship 
between knowledge and ignorance in Amazonian Ecuador, where my Waorani hosts make 
strategic claims of ignorance about shamanism and lament the ignorance of young people. 
While Waorani people are ‘wilfully ignorant’ of shamanism in part because its practice is 
associated with assault sorcery (High 2012a), young people are described as not having 
specific knowledge and abilities as a result of lacking specific bodily experiences associated 
with previous generations. Drawing on Roy Dilley’s (2010) notion of ‘bodily ignorance’, I 
examine the transmission of knowledge in terms of a Waorani ontological premise that 
refuses to separate knowing from being. By exploring the kinds of knowledge and being that 
shamanism, school education, and the bodily capacities of elders entail, I describe how 
Waorani are less concerned with the loss of ‘indigenous knowledge’ than they are with 
constituting the kinds of relations with various ‘others’ they envision in a comunidad 
(community). Their formulations of knowledge, its production and its absence challenge the 
focus on cultural reproduction implicit in much writing on indigenous knowledge, memory 
and Amazonian ethnography.  
 
Ignorance and Anthropology 
While questions of ignorance have long been neglected in anthropology, it is important to 
recognize that this is at least partly the result of its controversial presence in earlier 
anthropological debates. Perhaps the most prominent anthropological discussion of ignorance 
was sparked by Malinowski’s claim in The Sexual Life of Savages in North Western 
Melanesia (1929: 171) that ‘physical fatherhood is unknown’ to his informants in the 
 Trobriand Islands. Leach’s equally famous response to Malinowski in ‘The Virgin Birth’ 
(1966) provides a clue to why questions of ignorance have since fallen out of fashion in 
anthropology. For Leach, the Trobrianders’ insistence that baloma spirits, rather than men, 
were responsible for pregnancy was akin to the Christian notion of the Virgin Birth, rather 
than actual ignorance of physical paternity. In warning against the tendency to take specific 
religious claims as the total knowledge (and thus ignorance) of a particular society, he noted 
that ‘Western European scholars are strongly predisposed to believe that other people should 
believe in versions of the myth of the Virgin Birth. If we believe such things we are devout: if 
others do so they are idiots’ (Leach 1966: 41). 
Leach saw Malinowski’s claim as an example of the resilience of nineteenth-century 
evolutionist assumptions about ‘primitive societies’ being ignorant of basic knowledge; the 
idea, for example, that the supposed promiscuity of primitive societies coincided with their 
ignorance of paternity. I mention this example here merely to illustrate how debates about 
ignorance in anthropology were, until relatively recently, centrally about the question of 
whether certain societies demonstrated or lacked certain forms of knowledge characteristic of 
Europeans. In this sense, anthropologists have since had good reason to eschew questions of 
ignorance in favour of a more relativistic approach to culture and, more recently, adopting 
‘knowledge’ – rather than ignorance – as a primary ethnographic object. This is to say that 
non-knowledge ceased to be a viable category of ethnographic enquiry due to the moral and 
political connotations of ignorance in modern anthropology and Western thought more 
generally. 
And yet, while anthropologists today are no longer interested in describing certain 
people as ignorant, there remains an implicit assumption that much of the whole enterprise of 
anthropology is about establishing what Viveiros de Castro (2003: 3) describes as an 
‘epistemological advantage’ over the ‘native’. Whether in describing social structures, 
interpreting culture or simply engaging in participant observation, the basic assumption is that 
 anthropologists can and should come to understand things that their informants cannot. This, 
according to Viveiros de Castro, is in fact what distinguishes the ‘native’ from the 
anthropologist, as ‘the latter may be wrong about the former, but the former must be deluded 
about himself’ (ibid.: 4). What Viveiros de Castro is alluding to here is not simply an 
assumption of false consciousness on the part of ‘natives’ or their assumed failure to 
understand what anthropologists do, but a more general feature of how anthropologists tend to 
conceive of differences in terms of culture and representation. In positing culture as a 
plurality of perspectives on a single objective world, the ‘multiculturalist relativism’ of 
Western thinking ‘supposes a diversity of subjective and partial representations, each striving 
to grasp an external and unified nature’ (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 478). This multiculturalist 
understanding, and the epistemological advantage it implies on the part of anthropologists, 
has important consequences for how we think about anthropological knowledge and the 
knowledge of the people we study.1 Despite the increasing focus on reflexivity in 
anthropology, this epistemological advantage that Viveiros de Castro describes continues to 
inform the project of interpreting culture and meaning: 
 
What makes the native a native is the presupposition, on the part of the 
anthropologist, that the former’s relation to his culture is natural, that is, intrinsic 
and spontaneous, and, if possible, non-reflexive – or better still, unconscious. The 
native expresses his culture in his discourse; likewise the anthropologist, but if she 
intends to be something other than a native, she must express her culture 
culturally, that is, reflexively, conditionally and consciously. The anthropologist 
necessarily uses her culture; the native is sufficiently used by his[;] … the 
anthropologist holds total sway over those reasons of which the native’s reason 
knows nothing. She knows the exact doses of universality and particularity 
contained in the native, and the illusions which the latter entertains about himself 
 – whether manifesting his native culture all the while believing he’s manifesting 
human nature (the native ideologizes without knowing), or manifesting human 
nature all the while believing he’s manifesting his native culture (he cognizes 
unawares). (2003: 3–4) 
 
While this ignorance on the part of ‘natives’ remains an implicit assumption in certain 
conceptualizations of culture, the focus on ‘indigenous knowledge’ and ‘agency’ appears to 
indirectly address the epistemological imbalance described by Leach and Viveiros de Castro. 
Just as theorizations of agency in anthropology have challenged the notion that women, 
indigenous peoples and subaltern groups should be understood mainly in terms of marginality 
and subordination to structures of power, the central place of indigenous knowledge appears 
to be part of a similar political and ethical move within anthropology. Rather than debating 
whether or not certain ‘natives’ are truly ignorant of what the West upholds as ‘truth’ or 
‘rationality’, today we describe other forms of knowledge, other ways of knowing that 
sometimes depart in significant ways from our own. My point is not to dismiss this movement 
towards knowledge as a key object of anthropological study or to call for a return to 
pejorative speculations about ‘ignorant natives’. However, I suggest that, as ethnographers, 
we should also take seriously the claims our informants make about not knowing. While 
Malinowski and his predecessors appear to have spent considerable energy attempting to 
determine whether or not certain ‘primitive societies’ could truly be ignorant of Western 
standards of rationality, my interest in this chapter is to consider Waorani claims to non-
knowledge on their own terms, to think about the ethnographic contexts in which ignorance is 
expressed, valued, contested and lamented by different people.  
Approaching ignorance ethnographically in this way requires reconsidering how we 
tend to think about indigenous knowledge in places like Amazonia. One of the problems with 
placing indigenous knowledge at the forefront of anthropology is the tendency to associate 
 ‘knowledge’ with an implicit notion of cultural continuity. This is particularly striking in 
studies of indigenous Amazonia, where ethnographic descriptions of indigenous knowledge 
and agency tend to focus on the resilience of Amerindian sociocosmological principles and 
the creative responses indigenous peoples bring to social transformation in the face of 
colonial history and powerful contemporary outsiders. This preoccupation with knowledge, 
whether in writings about shamanism, environmental knowledge or advocacy for the 
intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples, risks ignoring indigenous claims to non-
knowledge.  
In this context, any potential gap in knowledge is assumed to be a problem, a cultural 
deficiency or worse, an indication of the loss of ‘traditional culture’. Like the exotic body 
imagery that has gained certain indigenous Amazonian peoples the status of ‘authenticity’ in 
the eyes of environmentalists and indigenous rights activists from around the world in recent 
decades (Conklin 1997), indigenous knowledge has an important political value that 
constitutes part of the changing ‘middle ground’ between Amazonian Indians and ecopolitics 
(Conklin and Graham 1995). As some groups are better able to seize on these expectations 
than others, and the governments of South American countries claim an interest in indigenous 
knowledge as part of a national heritage to be protected (Conklin 2002), alliances based on 
the cultivation and preservation of indigenous knowledge may prove just as fragile as those 
between indigenous people and environmentalists.  
The central aim of this chapter, as outlined above, is to think about Waorani notions of 
knowledge and ignorance outside of conventional Western concerns about cultural continuity 
and acculturation. Rather than worrying about what I think Waorani people should know and 
piecing together their accounts as partial (or even deficient) knowledge, I examine the 
practical and conceptual implications of ignorance for Waorani people themselves. This 
perspective leads to a series of questions about the mutual implication of knowledge and 
 ignorance in a context where knowing and not knowing are inseparable from indigenous 
understandings of being and bodily experience.  
 
Shamanic Knowledge and the Dangers of Being a Shaman 
In Amazonia, perhaps even more than in other parts of the world, shamanism has come to be 
seen as a key site and source of indigenous knowledge. Associated with specialized 
knowledge of plants, animals, spirits and healing, shamans have featured prominently in 
studies of indigenous cosmology (Harvey 2003; Thomas and Humphrey 1994; Brightman, 
Grotti and Ulturgasheva 2012). For similar reasons they are a focal point of ecotourism 
projects, ethnobotanical research and heated debates about intellectual property rights. 
Shamans have come to be defined, and in some contexts define themselves, as ‘guardians’ of 
indigenous knowledge in ways that are redefining the relationship between indigenous people 
and the state. In Brazil, for example, despite the ongoing conflicts between indigenous people 
and aggressive, state-driven development policies, indigenous knowledge is now cast as part 
of the country’s national patrimony (Conklin 2002). Similar concerns about indigenous 
knowledge can be seen in debates about museum collections and the ownership of native 
‘culture’ in North America (Brown 1998, 2004). Whether in the context of national debates 
about indigenous culture, global commercial interests or anthropological research, shamans 
have come to be seen as a key repository of knowledge. 
In Waorani villages shamanism is a manifestation of what we would conventionally 
describe as ‘indigenous knowledge’. But what kind of knowledge does it consist of? Waorani 
shamans know a great deal about plants and animals, and they know about them in ways 
ordinary people generally do not. Like shamanic practices described elsewhere, Waorani 
shamanism involves a form of communication between humans and animals. Shamans 
develop a special kin relationship with jaguars through dreams in which an ‘adopted’ jaguar-
spirit visits the shaman and speaks through the voice of its human ‘father’ (Rival 2002; High 
 2012b). As it temporarily inhabits the shaman’s body, the jaguar-spirit tells its adopted father 
and his family where to find game animals. Shamanic practices are associated with keeping 
animals close to Waorani people, ensuring their abundant supply and ‘attracting them back 
when they flee from people’ (Rival 2002: 78). In the Waorani language, shamans are called 
meñi (jaguar) or meñera (jaguar father) or, in accusations of assault sorcery, iroinga 
(witch/sorcerer).2 
In part as a result of the engagement with predatory jaguar-spirits that shamanism 
entails, and its association with sorcery, shamanic practices have become highly contentious 
in Waorani villages today. There are in fact very few Waorani who claim to be shamans, 
especially in the larger villages. While elders also describe sorcery as a cause of intergroup 
revenge-killings in past times, the establishment of permanent villages appears to have 
coincided with growing concerns about shamans carrying out sorcery against their 
neighbours. The proliferation of sorcery accusations in recent years should be understood in 
the context of a general transition from relatively autonomous Waorani households to the 
establishment of large villages since missionary settlement in the 1960s. These villages, the 
largest of which today incorporate up to two hundred people, bring together former ‘enemy’ 
families, people from other indigenous groups who intermarry with Waorani, and a range of 
non-indigenous Ecuadorians. This growth in the scale of Waorani villages and the 
intensification of intergroup relations they entail appears to have created fertile ground for 
sorcery accusations in a context where violence has a central place in social memory (High 
2009).3 
I initially came to understand Waorani fears and frustrations about sorcery and the 
apparent decline of shamanism as a result of missionary influences since the 1960s. The 
Waorani are best known for their relative isolation from other Ecuadorians until the late 
1950s, when five North American missionaries were killed by Waorani while attempting to 
establish an evangelical mission along the Curaray River. With the help of a Waorani woman 
 who had fled her people years before in the wake of intense violence between Waorani clans, 
the widow and sister of two of the deceased missionaries established a mission at Tiweno 
where, by the late 1960s, some five hundred or more Waorani had come to live for the first 
time among kowori (non-Waorani) people (Kimerling 1996: 181).  
Although few Waorani today identify as Christian, most who lived at the mission 
settlement had converted to Christianity by the early 1980s (Yost 1981; Robarchek and 
Robarchek 1998), when the missionary organization was expelled from Ecuador.4 The small 
number and marginal position of Waorani shamans today can be understood in part as a result 
of this process of missionization common to much of Amazonia (Vilaça and Wright 2009). 
However, rather than simply evidencing a loss of shamanic knowledge or indigenous ‘culture’ 
in the face of missionary teachings, the decline of Waorani shamanism is also related to the 
seriousness with which Waorani people understand the consequences of shamanic practices. 
The problem for my Waorani hosts is less one of losing shamanic knowledge than one of 
preventing the kind of ‘predatory’ relations that shamanism involves.  
As local concerns about shamans turning to sorcery appear to have intensified in this 
context of social transformation, the status of Waorani shamans was almost untenable in some 
villages at the time of my fieldwork. My hosts often denounced shamanism on the grounds 
that such practices constitute a threat to what they see as the ideal conditions of village life. 
As one of my Waorani interlocutors suggested, ‘Here we live well; we have no shamans’. His 
comment voiced a common concern about assault sorcery, which is often lamented as the 
cause of sickness and death. Although Waorani generally attribute these misfortunes to 
sorcery, few claim to know a great deal about how shamans carry out their attacks. What is 
clear to them, however, is that shamanism involves a highly dangerous two-way relationship 
between the shaman and his ‘adopted’ animal spirit in which human and nonhuman 
perspectives can be exchanged, confused or in dispute (Fausto 2004, 2007, 2012). Whereas 
Waorani people ordinarily identify themselves as victims of predatory human and nonhuman 
 forces (Rival 2002), many fear shamans may invert this relationship by adopting the predatory 
perspective of a jaguar-spirit. The result of this reversal of perspectives, according to my 
hosts, is sorcery, a process that involves a shaman domesticating his spirit animal ‘like a pet’, 
sending it to harm people (High 2012b).  
Shamans become potential killers when, through their anger or jealousy, they adopt 
the predatory perspective of jaguars or other animals. Since to see the world from the jaguar’s 
point of view is to be a killer, Waorani people who become jaguar-shamans are seen as a 
source of danger, even when they are respected elders with famous biographies in local lore. 
This dual perspective has made the social position of shamans increasingly untenable in 
contemporary Waorani communities where, after decades of revenge-killings between rival 
families, shamanism is seen as an obstacle to the local ideal of peaceful sociality. As a result, 
few self-proclaimed shamans remain in the villages in the western part of the Waorani reserve 
where I work. Fear, suspicion and outright hostility towards shamans appear to be widespread 
across many of the more than thirty present Waorani communities, where people who are 
socially distant or perceived to be selfish and untrustworthy are rumoured to practise assault 
sorcery.  
With the rampant speculation that circulates about who is responsible for sorcery 
attacks, it is no surprise that few Waorani claim much knowledge about them. On a recent 
visit to a Waorani community, two brothers complained to me that their mother was ill as a 
result of the sorcery of a shaman living nearby. When I asked them why their neighbour 
would want to harm other people in the village, they explained that the man was sad and 
‘angry’ (pii) that his own son had recently died, and as a result performed sorcery against 
their mother out of jealousy. The same man, who was rumoured to have become a shaman 
only recently, while living in a distant kowori community, was also blamed for the death of a 
child in the village. People commented that seeing other families prosper with many children 
made the man feel a kind of jealous envy that eventually led him to attack his neighbours.  
 Although the kin of these victims, and the surviving victims themselves, identify 
specific shamans who they say are responsible for assault sorcery, they rarely have much to 
say about how the attacks are carried out. My questions in this direction were usually met 
simply with claims to ignorance, such as aramai (‘I don’t see’) or iñinamai (‘I don’t hear’), 
followed by moral evaluations of the act itself, such as wiwa keranipa (‘they do badly’) or 
ononki wentapa (‘he/she killed without reason’). This is because to claim knowledge about 
the actual techniques of shamanism would be, I suggest, tantamount to claiming one’s own 
ability as a shaman, thus opening oneself up to potential sorcery accusations. In this context, 
not knowing can be seen as a strategic defence against unwanted, negative attention: a way of 
denying relations that are considered to be inappropriate (Chua 2009). 
While the emphasis on not knowing about shamanism may in part be a strategic denial 
in the context of sorcery accusations, I suggest that this form of ignorance also has an 
ontological dimension. Contrary to the assumption that shamanism is centrally premised on a 
specialized body of accumulated knowledge, Waorani people envision shamanism more as a 
particular state of being that implies relations with nonhuman entities. Beyond strategically 
denying inappropriate relations, these claims to ignorance are expressed with the awareness 
that ‘knowing’ about shamanism is not altogether distinct from ‘being’ a shaman. In a context 
where ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ are not theorized as separate, knowledge about the 
practice of sorcery would necessarily imply a predatory perspective. As Viveiros de Castro 
(2004) observes in Amerindian shamanism more generally, ‘Shamanism is a form of acting 
that presupposes a mode of knowing, a particular ideal of knowledge’. In contrast to ‘the 
objectivist folk epistemology of our tradition’, in Amazonian shamanism ‘[t]o know is to 
personify, to take on the point of view of that which must be known’ (Viveiros de Castro 
2004: 468). 
Waorani explain that people often become shamans not as a conscious choice, but as a 
consequence of events outside their own control. One risks becoming a shaman as a result of 
 a life-threatening accident or illness, such as suffering a severe malarial fever, becoming a 
victim of sorcery or surviving a plane crash. As can be seen in the above example, the man 
accused of sorcery is described as having become a shaman after experiencing tremendous 
emotional pain. Such experiences, whether an accident or other personal trauma, may lead 
people to see the world from the perspective of a predatory jaguar. In Carla Stang’s (2009) 
description of the Mehinaku in the Brazilian Amazon, changes in emotional consciousness, 
marked by excessive fear or desire, have the potential to collapse ontological boundaries and 
cause people to enter into different worlds. In Mehinaku understanding, people risk coming to 
see the world from the perspective of spirits or animals, rather than that of living humans.5 In 
a similar way, Waorani do more than simply acquire a kind of knowledge about the world 
when they become shamans: they become a different kind of being in the world. They carry 
out assault sorcery because, like jaguars, they see people as animal prey.  
For Waorani people this shamanic perspective is not as much a form of knowledge as 
it is an ontological state that allows people to engage in different kinds of relations. In 
contrast to positivistic scientific traditions that seek to fill in knowledge gaps by accumulating 
facts with the aim of moving ever closer to a universal truth, Waorani shamanism is part of a 
cosmology that assumes the ways in which people experience the world to be inherently 
transformative. Although some shamans are known to be particularly powerful and 
experienced, Waorani anxieties about them focus less on the level or degree of their ability 
than on the question of whether one is or is not a shaman. Put another way, it not a question of 
whether a person is ‘more’ or ‘less’ shamanic or knowledgeable, but what perspective they 
bring to relations with other people. 
Waorani seldom question whether one’s point of view is ‘real’ or ‘true’, but are 
concerned instead with the moral implications and effects of the perspective taken in a given 
relation. That killers and, at times, shamans experience the world from the jaguar’s point of 
view is not a point of debate or speculation, even for Waorani who have converted to 
 evangelical Christianity. It is simply a manifestation of the dangers inherent in a 
transformative world in which various kinds of agency are not restricted to human beings. 
Some Waorani explain that they converted to Christianity in the 1960s precisely because they 
hoped it would protect them from the sorcery of shamans. This ontological premise sheds 
some light on current efforts to quell shamanism in Waorani villages. Not knowing about 
shamanism is not only a strategic claim, but also a desired state of being that confers a 
person’s moral position within a wider set of relations. Like positioning oneself as a victim, in 
this context being ignorant is part of embracing a fully human perspective. 
 
Bodily Ignorance and Waorani Ways of Knowing 
Waorani understandings of shamanism and assault sorcery illustrate how ignorance, seen in 
the context of actual social relations and cosmology, cannot simply be reduced to the loss of 
indigenous knowledge, much less a pejorative sense of moral or intellectual deficiency. Not 
knowing about shamanism is in many ways a strategic claim that confers a commitment to 
what most Waorani people consider to be a desirable form of sociality. It is an important part 
of living in what my hosts describe as a comunidad that brings together several Waorani 
groups who were engaged in intense mutual hostilities a few decades ago.6 Of course, it 
would be misleading to construe the cultural value placed on not knowing about shamanism 
as the only, or even the primary place of ignorance in Waorani communities. Just as any 
ethnography of knowledge should account for multiple and in many cases contrasting forms 
of knowledge in a given social context, there are multiple meanings and values attributed to 
ignorance.  
This section considers how, in contrast to the ignorance people claim about 
shamanism, Waorani elders in some contexts lament the absence of knowledge among young 
people. At the same time that Waorani efforts to stem the threat of shamanism embrace 
ignorance as an indigenous expression of discontinuity with past violence, recent social 
 transformations have also led to certain anxieties about the kinds of knowledge and skill that 
Waorani fear may be lost from one generation to the next. While their concerns about the 
failure of certain forms of cultural transmission reveal a clear contrast to the strategic 
ignorance of shamanism described in the previous section, indigenous understandings of 
learning and bodily experience also point to the same ontological premise that emerges in 
shamanism. Both of these contexts reveal how, in Waorani understanding, questions of 
knowledge and being are mutually constituted.  
It is difficult to ignore the ways in which the social and political lives of Waorani 
people have transformed radically in the past few decades. Elders often recount stories from 
the period that preceded the arrival of missionaries, a time they associate with the relative 
autonomy of individual households, the hardships of intense interclan revenge-killings and the 
invasions of kowori outsiders. The causes of this violence and the relative isolation that some 
Waorani still struggle to maintain have sparked considerable interest and debate among 
missionaries, anthropologists and other outsiders. Various scholars have pointed to colonial 
history (Cipolletti 2002), sociobiology (Beckerman and Yost 2007) and ethnopsychology 
(Robarchek and Robarchek 1998) in attempting to explain the remarkable degree of ‘pre-
contact’ violence between Waorani people. However, they generally agree that, in the years 
prior to missionary settlement, the frequency of intergroup spear-killings accounted for a 
remarkably high proportion of deaths among the Waorani, whose population was only around 
five hundred in the 1950s (Yost 1981).7 Today elders remember not only how they lost many 
kin to revenge-killings, but also how they feared the intrusion of kowori – whom they 
assumed to be semi-human cannibals. 
Today, some fifty years after U.S. missionaries established the evangelical mission, 
most Waorani live in multi-family villages with airstrips and state-supported schools. While 
the bulk of missionary activity ended in the early 1980s, today young people learn Spanish at 
school and make regular visits to Ecuadorian cities, and most men at some point work on 
 temporary contracts for oil companies operating on Waorani lands. The oil industry, which 
has intensified and expanded its activities on Waorani lands considerably since the 1960s 
(Stoll 1982), has had a major social and ecological impact that is felt in even the most remote 
Waorani villages. While changes like these are not unique to the Waorani or to Amazonia 
more generally, the prominent place of violence and group autonomy in Waorani social 
memory gives particular salience to the contrasting generational experiences of elders and 
young people (High 2015).  
Elders embrace many of the changes they have seen since missionization, a period 
they describe in Spanish as civilización (civilization). For them, civilización refers not only to 
a time when many Waorani converted to Christianity, but also to the relative peace, the 
intensification of relations with kowori people and the rapid expansion of the Waorani 
population. Above all, discourses of civilización draw a contrast between this sense of 
expanding social relations and the violence and isolation they ascribe to previous times. 
However, elders and many young people do not simply remember the past as a time of 
hardship and suffering. Deceased kin and the elders (pikenani) who survived the period of 
raiding prior to the mission are also associated with a sense of freedom and independence by 
which even young Waorani people today distinguish themselves from other indigenous 
groups and mestizo (non-indigenous) Ecuadorians. Ancestors are associated with the skill and 
strength that my hosts say allowed them to maintain their autonomy in the past and provide 
abundant food to their kin. Elders today, both men and women, are celebrated in a similar 
way, as are the few ‘uncontacted’ groups who live in voluntary isolation within the Waorani 
ethnic reserve (High 2013).8 Elders and uncontacted groups are emblematic of the value 
Waorani people generally place on the idea of being durani bai (‘like the ancient ones’). 
But how do Waorani reconcile the notion of being ‘like the ancient ones’ with an 
equally important notion of being ‘civilized’ and living in close contact with kowori people? 
This is a context where generational changes come to the fore: where young people who 
 attend Ecuadorian schools become knowledgeable and skilled in things that their parents and 
grandparents are not. In many cases elders acknowledge young people’s abilities to interact 
with kowori people and technologies in more productive ways than they can. This recognition 
is one of the key reasons that urban Waorani political leaders are almost invariably young 
men who speak reasonably good Spanish and have completed at least a basic school 
education. However, it is increasingly apparent to elders that young people also lack certain 
abilities associated with being ‘like the ancestors’. This is a concern that elders expressed 
repeatedly during my fieldwork, despite their statements in support of civilización and formal 
education. They sometimes lament young people not having the strength or skills expected of 
young adults, who in the past were expected to carry out nearly all subsistence tasks and other 
household responsibilities from an early age (Rival 1996; High 2006).9 
Rather than referring to a sense of ignorance or knowledge in the abstract, in alluding 
to the perceived deficiencies of young people, elders say that they ‘don’t see’ (aramai) or that 
they ‘don’t hear’ (iñinamai). In this context and in others, they refer to non-knowledge as a 
consequence of the absence of specific bodily experiences. At one level, for example, young 
people know less about the forest because, as students who spend most of their time in school 
or in the village, they lack the same sensory experience of ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ in the forest 
and gardens that older adults demonstrate. It is perhaps not surprising that, in a society that 
traditionally depends on hunting, gathering and small-scale gardening, there is an emphasis on 
the body as a source of knowledge. What became particularly noticeable during my 
fieldwork, however, is that parents and elders do not see school education as directly 
responsible for what they see as the deficiencies of young people. In contrast to Western ideas 
about the effects of school education, they do not envision direct competition between these 
two kinds of knowledge, with one potentially replacing the other. Nor do they say that young 
people fail to listen to the detailed stories that elders tell about their ancestors while sitting 
around the cooking hearth in the evenings.  
 Instead, on several occasions during fieldwork I heard parents complain that young 
people today ‘don’t know’ certain things because their bodies are deficient. They explained 
that the current generation of boys and girls is weaker than previous ones, who were stronger 
and better able to withstand hard work in the gardens and long treks in the forest. In their 
view, young people are weak in part because, unlike elders, they were never whipped with a 
jungle vine after male elders returned from peccary hunts. Men and women often recall how, 
in their childhood, they suffered these painful lashes from their father or grandfather. Elders 
explain that this practice made children strong enough to hunt peccaries and carry out tedious 
gardening work themselves one day. Being subjected to whippings is understood as a way of 
transmitting knowledge or ability from one person to another through specific bodily 
practices, whereby children acquire the capacities of adults.10 Rather than being a form of 
punishment to correct mistakes, the whipping of children reveals a particular understanding 
that bodily experiences constitute the acquisition of specific kinds of knowledge and agency 
(High 2010).11 
Some elders say that they stopped whipping children during the missionary period – 
the time of civilización. The resulting lack of embodied knowledge appears to have had a 
particular impact on young men, who are said to be unable to hunt peccaries with spears and 
to be ignorant of many aspects of life in the forest. So why, given this understanding of 
knowledge as constituted through (painful) bodily experience, do few parents today whip 
their children? In response to this question, one father told me that he does not whip his 
children because their arms and legs are too weak and would break from the impact of the 
lashes.12 He explained that young people cannot withstand the whippings because today they 
eat too much ‘foreign food’ (kowori kengi), referring to the rice, noodles, oatmeal and other 
kowori foods they eat in school lunches and during trips to frontier cities. In this sense, their 
bodies are seen as deficient in terms of both knowledge (lacking specific bodily experiences) 
and their very constitution. This is particularly significant in a society where consanguinity is 
 understood to be made within household groups through the shared consumption of food and 
drink in everyday life (Rival 1998; Overing and Passes 2000).  
The idea that young people are becoming physically and culturally deficient as a result 
of recent changes resonates with studies elsewhere in Amazonia, where older generations of 
men are understood locally to have grown larger, stronger and more capable than men today, 
who have never experienced specific rituals after warfare (Conklin 2001). What is clear in 
these cases is that men are seen as unable to ‘actualize their masculine potential’ (Conklin 
2001: 155) as a result of not experiencing specific bodily transformations. The problem is not 
just that young men and women today are failing to fulfil their expected gendered roles, but 
also that they lack specific embodied capacities attributed to previous generations – capacities 
that are in fact central to indigenous ideas of what it means to be a proper Waorani person. 
Whereas young Waorani are seen as being less ‘hard’ or ‘strong’ (teemo) than elders, the few 
remaining uncontacted groups are said to have remarkable physical abilities and knowledge 
due to their strict diet of ‘Waorani’ foods and because, in contrast to ‘civilized’ Waorani who 
live in villages, they continue to whip their children.  
In discussing this state of affairs, Waorani elders appear to be voicing concerns about 
young people’s lack of bodily knowledge, or their ‘bodily ignorance’ (Dilley 2010: 184). Roy 
Dilley develops the concept of bodily ignorance in attempting to redirect discussions of 
ignorance from conventional questions of epistemology to those of ontology: 
 
My point is that in the absence of culturally specific bodily techniques and 
mastery of bodily forms, this ignorance or not-knowing, if we can call it such, is 
construed in ways that indicate fundamental moral problems of definition about 
what it is to be human. An absence of ‘bodily knowledge’, as we coin it, is not 
simply a form of ignorance; it is often related to questions of being. (Dilley 2010: 
184–85) 
  
In the hierarchical context of Senegalese craftworkers that Dilley describes, knowing or not 
knowing specific forms of knowledge is a social function of the division of labour, whereby 
learning is transmitted within bounded social groups and ignorance is part of what maintains 
the gulf between different social statuses. As specific skills and knowledge ‘are conceived as 
being linked to particular lines of descent traced back to the mythological originators of a 
trade’ (Dilley 2010: 184), people who do not master their natal craft are seen as ‘lesser 
exemplars of craft being’ and their ignorance ‘relates to the whole being of the person, not 
just to an inquiring mind or an ability to see the world’ (ibid.).  
In the relatively egalitarian context of the Waorani, the bodily ignorance of young 
people is conceived as a failure with respect to indigenous understandings of personhood. 
While young people, no matter how weak or ignorant they appear to elders, are still 
considered to be Waorani, their perceived deficiencies are often compared to those of kowori 
people – an explicit measure of moral failure. The strong moral connotation of the word 
kowori can be seen in its reference not only to non-Waorani ‘enemy/others’, but also 
cannibals who prey on Waorani, the true measure of proper people. In the worst of cases, a 
young person risks being called kowori bai (‘like a kowori’) when he or she transgresses 
specific expectations of Waorani sociality. So whereas in Dilley’s discussion of specialized 
craftsmen, ‘the weaver who cannot weave is a lesser kind of weaver-person than one who 
can’ (2010: 184), for Waorani people bodily ignorance implies a kind of deficiency at a more 
generalized level of what it means to be a person. In both of these cases, however, ignorance 
has important ontological dimensions that extend beyond questions of knowledge.  
 
Learning and Being in School 
Although Waorani once associated kowori people relatively unambiguously with predatory 
violence and generally avoided them, today they tend to praise their medicines, manufactured 
 goods and skills, such as the ability to fly aeroplanes and drive cars. For Waorani people these 
skills and knowledge are in no way exclusive to kowori people, at least not in principle. 
During fieldwork my hosts repeatedly expressed their curiosity about objects and abilities 
they wanted to know more about, whether this was the process of manufacturing an 
aluminium pot, piloting the small aeroplanes that often arrive in their villages, or space travel. 
Increasingly confident that some kowori can be trusted in certain things, they see this new 
knowledge as attainable through their interaction with Ecuadorians and other outsiders. Their 
desire to attain new technologies and new knowledge may have contributed, among other 
things, to the increasing Waorani preference for interethnic marriages with indigenous groups 
who have more extensive contact with the national society.  
While the younger generations are seen as lacking in certain forms of knowledge as a 
result of not having been whipped by elders and eating too much kowori food, they also are 
expected to learn new and important knowledge in school. But what is it, according to 
parents, that children ‘see’ and ‘hear’ in the context of formal education? In school, Waorani 
students are understood to inhabit a kowori world – this is in fact the whole point of formal 
education for Waorani people: to learn Spanish and to become familiarized with skills and 
knowledge that are relatively unknown to older people. More specifically, they are expected 
to hear and see things in the presence of kowori teachers, who are predominantly mestizos or 
indigenous people from other parts of Ecuador. Parents hope that this education will allow 
young people to engage kowori people more productively in the future and lift Waorani 
people out of their relatively marginal social position in Ecuador.  
At the time of my primary fieldwork (2002–2004), teachers spent a considerable 
amount of time reprimanding students for their poor study skills and admonishing parents for 
doing little to encourage their children to study at home. In some ways the teachers were right 
in their assessment of the situation. Many Waorani parents, despite the strong support they 
voice for schools and the sacrifices they make to keep their children in them, do not pressure 
 young people to do their homework or to improve their performance at school. While part of 
this may be the result of the generational transformations described above, whereby elders 
have relatively little knowledge of the content of formal education, it also reflects a strong 
emphasis on personal autonomy in a cultural context in which parents rarely make specific 
demands on young people. They do, however, place considerable emphasis on their children’s 
school attendance. For these parents, the kind of learning that occurs in school is primarily the 
consequence of a physical presence in the school and among kowori teachers. The assumption 
is that if young people attend the classes they will somehow automatically learn the kowori 
skills and knowledge that elders see themselves as lacking.13 
It emerged in my discussions with parents that, in their view, if children attend classes 
and fail to learn, it is clearly because the teachers are in some way failing to demonstrate the 
abilities and knowledge expected of them. This is because, for them, learning is less about 
coercive discipline or an abstract process of acquiring knowledge than it is about learning 
from the presence of people who demonstrate their knowledge by carrying out specific 
practices (Bloch 1991). This is much the same way I came to understand Waorani approaches 
to teaching and learning in the home and in the forest: adults generally teach by example, by 
demonstrating certain skills and knowledge, whether this is the ability to weave a makeshift 
basket in which to carry fish home or identifying bird calls or the traces of animals on hunting 
trips. The assumption is that people, young and old, will learn by being in the presence of 
others who demonstrate these abilities, rather than being repeatedly instructed and corrected. 
In this way, processes of learning and cultural transmission should be understood in the 
context of specific forms of sociality that are not always appreciated or recognized in formal 
school education.  
The conflicts that emerged between Waorani parents and kowori teachers at the time 
of my fieldwork reveal some of the tensions between formal schooling and the mutual 
implication of knowledge and being in Waorani understandings of learning. One of the major 
 complaints from parents was that teachers in the village were drinking too much, to the extent 
that some either missed their lessons or appeared drunk in the presence of students. At one 
point teachers were also hosting late-night parties in which teenage students joined them in 
drinking tiname (cane liquor). The central concern for parents was not just that the teachers’ 
behaviour would prevent their children learning in school, but that they were learning one of 
the kowori practices that is most despised by elders. While Waorani people value many of the 
technologies, objects and practices they associate with kowori, the consumption of alcohol is 
one of the key practices by which elders distinguish Waorani from non-Waorani people. As a 
particularly kowori state of being, drunkenness is described in stark contrast to the 
distinguishing characteristics of the pikenani, whose revered knowledge and skill are seen as 
antithetical to being drunk or ‘crazy’ (dowenta bai). The Waorani were until recently almost 
unique among indigenous peoples in Ecuador for their lack of alcohol, preferring to drink 
even their manioc beer (tepe) almost entirely unfermented. 
It is in this context that Waorani parents and elders raised serious concerns about 
teachers drinking. They worried that students, rather than learning to read, write and engage 
in other valued kowori ways of knowing by their presence at school, were becoming kowori 
bai (like kowori people) as a result of the presence of drunk teachers. Despite their usual 
deference to the authority of teachers in village affairs, several parents denounced the teachers 
at a village-wide meeting and successfully petitioned the educational authorities in the 
regional capital to have one of the teachers dismissed from the school. Waorani 
understandings of school education, and learning more generally, again illustrate the ways in 
which knowing and being are mutually implicated. In a context where highly valued new 
knowledge is sought precisely from people whose moral standing as kowori ‘others’ is 
constantly in question, it is perhaps no surprise that formal education raises certain problems 
in Waorani villages. The central question, for my Waorani hosts, appears to be how to 
become skilled in reading, writing and other abilities without becoming ‘like kowori’.  
  
Conclusions 
Anthropological approaches to ignorance demand much more than the age-old questions 
about what is known and what is not in a given society. In the context described here, such an 
approach requires attention to Waorani understandings of learning, the body, and the moral 
implications of knowledge and being in a changing world. Seen as a form of ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ or ‘traditional culture’, shamanism is often valued as an important expression of 
cultural continuity in places like Amazonia. For many Waorani, however, shamans are 
contentious and dangerous figures who have the potential to carry out assault sorcery by 
engaging the point of view of predatory jaguar-spirits. In this context, where knowing about 
shamanism is not entirely separable from being a shaman, ignorance of such practices confers 
a certain commitment to a fully human perspective on social relations. The idea that rejecting 
or denying certain forms of knowledge can constitute ‘strategic ignorance’ should be familiar 
in many if not most of the ethnographic contexts described by anthropologists. The 
knowledge economies of the modern world, in fact, which are increasingly focused on the 
creation of strategic gaps in knowledge, could equally be described as ‘ignorance economies’ 
(Roberts and Armitage 2008). However, an anthropology of ignorance should recognize that 
ignorance is not just strategic; nor does it necessarily mark a state of social or intellectual 
deficiency. It is also produced and conceived and acquires meanings in ways that depart 
significantly from economies of knowledge familiar to the West. 
The point is not simply to recognize that different societies have different ‘ignorance 
economies’, but also to consider how the different kinds of not-knowing found in a given 
ethnographic context, strategic or otherwise, relate to ontological questions about what a 
person is. Like the multiple forms of knowledge alluded to by Leach and many scholars since, 
the different values of ignorance may appear contradictory. In the brief examples presented 
here, Waorani claims to ignorance about shamanism confer one’s place within indigenous 
 understandings of personhood, while at the same time and in the same place indigenous 
concerns about bodily ignorance raise the spectre that certain young people may be becoming 
deficient, to the extent that they are sometimes compared to kowori. Even in situations where 
people lament the absence of knowledge, questions of ‘knowing’ and ‘being’ prove 
inseparable and are closely linked to bodily experience. By locating ignorance at the interface 
of indigenous understandings of knowledge and being, it has been the aim of this chapter to 
illustrate how we might come to understand the ways in which not-knowing is valued, 
lamented and contested in social life. At the very least, ethnographies of ignorance should 
make us ask what ‘indigenous knowledge’ means to so-called ‘natives’ and what its absence 
implies for their own ways of being. 
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Notes 
                                                     
1 Viveiros de Castro describes how this ‘multiculturalist’ cosmology is but one way of 
thinking about difference. His formulation of Amerindian perspectivism, for example, 
describes a ‘multinaturalist’ cosmology that, in contrast to Western cosmology, supposes ‘a 
spiritual unity and a corporeal diversity’ where ‘culture or the subject would be the form of 
the universal, whilst nature or the object would be the form of the particular’ (1998: 470). 
2 These attacks, referred to in this chapter as ‘sorcery’ or ‘witchcraft’, are sometimes 
described by Waorani using the Spanish word brujería, meaning ‘witchcraft’. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 It is also worth noting that, since the 1970s, many Waorani have intermarried with Quichua-
speaking indigenous people, who are known for their powerful shamans in Amazonian 
Ecuador and elsewhere in the Upper Amazon (Reeve and High 2012). In most cases these 
Quichua spouses move to a Waorani village after marriage. 
4 While the missionaries were affiliated with the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), one 
the women who established the Tiweno mission remained among the Waorani until her death 
in 1994. 
5 See Londoño Sulkin (2005) for another Amazonian example of how immoral behaviour is 
attributed to nonhuman perspectives. 
6 Waorani use the Spanish word comunidad to describe their villages and to convey a sense of 
mutual participation in periodic collective activities, many of which are closely related to a 
local school. In contrast to the sense of collective unity by which many outsiders imagine 
‘indigenous communities’, there remains a high degree of autonomy among households and 
clusters of closely related households in large Waorani villages. 
7 In part as a result of the decrease in revenge-killings and the growth of large families in 
villages since mission settlement, the current Waorani population is estimated to be around 
2,500. 
8 These ‘uncontacted’ groups are the subject of considerable interest and debate among the 
Waorani and in Ecuador more generally. Waorani people until recently described all people 
living in voluntary isolation in their territory as Tagaeri, in reference to the man Tagae who 
fled deep into the forest with his followers after refusing mission settlement. Today these 
groups are more often described as Taromenani, a group of mysterious origins who apparently 
decimated and possibly incorporated the remaining Tagaeri in recent years. Some Waorani 
have been involved in ongoing violent conflicts with these ‘uncontacted’ people since the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1980s, culminating in a large-scale attack on an isolated longhouse in 2003 (Cabodevilla 
2004; Cabodevilla and Berraonda 2005). 
9 This is part of a wider Waorani emphasis on individual autonomy evident in many aspects of 
social and political life (High 2007). 
10 This notion of bodily knowledge appears to have at least some historical depth among the 
Waorani and elsewhere in Amazonia. For example, according to the account of an early 
evangelical missionary who met Waorani people in the 1950s, one of the first Waorani men 
he brought to a large Ecuadorian town asked to be beaten by a tractor driver so that he would 
acquire the ability to use the machinery in his home village (Wallis 1960: 256). 
11 Fisher (2001: 122) describes another Amazonian example of how, in indigenous 
understanding, social qualities are created through ‘bodily states’. 
12 Rival (2002: 162) makes a similar observation regarding Waorani views on dietary changes 
leading to ‘soft’ bodies. 
13 In recent years a number of Waorani women and men have become teachers in their own 
communities. It remains to be seen how this will affect Waorani understandings of the role of 
schools in their villages. 
